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I. WHAT is PHYSICS?
What is physics? Is there a unifying theme to what we, as physicists, study, whether it
be classical or quantum? How do we effectively convey our ideas to each other? Are there
limits to what we may say? The sciences can very generally be divided into two categories:
the life sciences that tend to be taxonomic and statistical and the physical sciences that tend
to be procedural. In some sense, physics is pure, unadulterated ‘scientific methodology’ if
you will. It represents a way of thinking about the world that starts, by one account,
from stable, given facts - observations, measurements in the form of numbers,
isolated and purified substances that are part of an unchanging, solid reality.
Logic then compels the assembling (a process carefully controlled by existing
theory) of these indisputable pieces of the real world into a theory which literally
re-presents that world: a perfect match that, when done correctly, admits no
doubt. The theory is checked by the fact, by the real world, and underwritten
by the rigor and purity of the scientific method. Together, hard fact and reliable
method provide [physics] with a unique and powerful tool for self-correction that
eliminates (in the long run) all forms of bias and error, yielding a neutral and
objective progressive approach to equally neutral and objective final truths. ([1],
p. xii)
Technically the above quote was talking about the sciences in general, but I took the liberty
of substituting ‘physics’ for ‘the sciences’ in the quote since it so succinctly describes one
very popular view of our discipline.
The reality, of course, is more complicated. One could say physics represents a way of
doing that involves a great deal of trial-and-error:
days, months, and years of what many [physicists] call “tinkering” - trying to get
a piece of equipment to work properly, interpreting messy data, separating signal
from noise, articulating a new theory and explanations for new phenomena. Any
decent [physicist] knows that results and explanations are always open to revision
- indeed, must be revised if those results and explanations are to mean or work
for anything ([1], p. xiv).
Again I took the liberty of substituting ‘physicist’ for ‘scientist.’ Or, to paraphrase a col-
league of mine, we’re simply modeling the world of our sensory perceptions as best we can.
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2We constantly seek out models that are more encompassing, but they are models nonethe-
less. This does not, however, release us from our obligation to rigor and the strictures of the
scientific method.
But there’s something more to physics than simply this. Physics likes to strip out all
the extraneous baggage of a problem before reassembling it. Physics deals with the most
fundamental aspects of the universe. Thus, in that sense, it is the science of simplification.
The best physical theories are both simple and elegant and provide building blocks from
which we may re-assemble nature. In contemplating the explanatory limits of physics, it
makes sense to keep this in mind. But in the process we also must take special care in our
use of the language within which we form our ideas. In the words of Fortun and Bernstein,
Language matters. Language is essential to reason, and can’t be gotten rid of
so easily with a few new machines. Somewhere along the line - no matter how
long that line is - every experiment, every mathematical equation, every pure
numerical value will have to find its way into words. ([1], p. 43)
And so we begin with that most nebulous of words, ‘stuff.’
II. IN SEARCH OF THE HOLY GRAIL
The universe is made up of a lot of interacting ‘stuff.’ While we, as physicists, may be
interested either in the nature of the ‘stuff’ or the nature of the interactions themselves,
we can all agree that, without the interactions, the universe would be a very boring place.
In fact, it is often through the interactions that we come to understand the ‘stuff’ since,
on a fundamental level, these interactions transfer information in various forms including
momentum and energy. The unification of the four most fundamental interactions via a
‘theory of everything’ has been a long-standing goal of theoretical physicists [21]. For many
years string theory was expected to fulfill this dream, or so the story goes. While still
likely to yield very promising results, it appears it may simply be a better refinement of
existing quantum field theories, though the jury is still out. But even if it were to unify
the four fundamental interactions, there are numerous other fundamental phenomena on
which it is seemingly silent. Most crucially, it does very little to further our understanding
of how the macroscopic world emerges from the microscopic world, nor does it do much to
further elucidate the nebulous boundary between the quantum and the classical which may
or may not be the same thing as the boundary between ‘micro’ and ‘macro,’ as we shall
see. As physicists we are always seeking broader explanations that include more phenomena
under fewer umbrellas, so-to-speak. The problems these issues present must be successfully
addressed by any theory that boasts of being a ‘theory of everything.’ Indeed the nature
of these problems pushes the boundary of what is even possible within physics itself as a
discipline, a way of thinking, a way of doing, and a body of knowledge.
In terms of interactions the Standard Model of particle physics and its extensions suc-
cessfully explains three of the traditional four fundamental of these with gravity the ‘odd
man out.’ Nonetheless, one might concede the possibility that some future extension of
the Standard Model could bring gravity into the fold. In this case, the four fundamental
interactions would each be accompanied by a mediator particle - the photon for the electro-
magnetic, vector bosons (W+, W−, and Z0) for the weak nuclear, gluons for the color, and
gravitons for the gravitational. One could consider the Higgs mechanism and its associated
3boson as well as being fundamental assuming it is eventually verified. Higher order micro-
scopic interactions, such as the strong nuclear, possess their own mediator particle (e.g. the
meson). One can theoretically use these as the building blocks for ordinary macroscopic
matter [2] with one glaring exception: the extended structure of the atom. In addition to
two of the fundamental interactions, ‘building’ an atom requires invocation of the Pauli Ex-
clusion Principle (PEP). PEP may be understood in the context of the Standard Model via
the spin-statistics theorem - fields ultimately possess certain commutation properties that
manifest themselves, after the action of a field operator, as bosons or fermions, the latter
obeying PEP. In other words, we would find that a certain field has to be commuting (or
perhaps anti-commuting) or else we get, in the words of Tony Zee, ‘a nonvanishing piece of
junk’ in our mathematics [3] (p.119).
How good a physical description is this? Physically speaking, what is a ‘nonvanishing
piece of junk’ exactly? With its vision of mediating interactions, the Standard Model inher-
ently incorporates special relativity - mediator particles are constrained by the same rules
as any other and thus can’t carry information about an interaction superluminally. This
is easily visualized. But what does it mean for a field to possess a mathematical property
such as a commutation rule? Crucially, how does this connect to the reality we experience
on a macroscopic level? I will hold off discussing the former question until a bit later. As
for the latter, as Zee notes
[i]t is sometimes said that because of electromagnetism you do not sink through
the floor and because of gravity you do not float to the ceiling, and you would be
sinking or floating in total darkness were it not for the weak interaction, which
regulates stellar burning. Without the spin statistics connection, electrons would
not obey Pauli exclusion. Matter would just collapse. ([3] pp. 119-120)
In other words, constructing the macroscopic world of our senses requires the interaction
picture along with a healthy dose of PEP.
III. TROUBLE IN PARADISE
The macroscopic and classical worlds are usually described in terms of forces, as any
veteran of an introductory physics course is likely to tell you. It is one of the many things
engineers rely on when designing systems that we use in our everyday lives. Forces are
easily understood within the context of the interaction picture if they are defined as the rate
of momentum transfer between interacting objects - no interaction means no momentum
transfer and thus no force [2]. (This ignores the question of why we might define them
as such.) In fact, as Zee notes, the fact ‘[t]hat the exchange of a particle can produce
a force was one of the most profound conceptual advances in physics’ [3] (p. 27). But
PEP does not represent an interaction. In theory, nothing should be transferred between
objects associated through PEP meaning we should not be able to associate forces with
PEP. Specifically, within causal quantum field theories, both the commutator (for two-boson
fields) and anti-commutator (for two-fermion fields) must vanish for space-like separations
[4]. Interactions are causal processes. Since particles associated through some process via
PEP can’t be interacting with one another, they must be space-like separated. One of the
axioms of relativistic quantum field theory is thus that any pair of space-like separated
observables must commute.
4How might the issue of PEP cause much trouble, though, if the Standard Model explains
it? We are already aware of the disconnect between the quantum and classical worlds so
couldn’t we just write this off as something irrelevant to classical, Newtonian/Einsteinian
physics? Here’s why we can’t if we work within the interaction picture. In that case the
existence of non-pointlike objects ought to elicit qualms in anyone whose business it is
to provide a coherent description of the universe. The qualms might turn into genuine
queasiness for, say, a stellar astrophysicist when he or she attempts to describe a white
dwarf star in which the inward pressure of the gravitational interaction is counter-balanced
by degeneracy pressure, i.e. PEP (math): to borrow a bit from physics pedagogy, how
can we draw a free-body diagram of a stable chunk of white dwarf star if forces are only
associated with interactions? In fact, given our definition of forces, a stable chunk of white
dwarf star violates all three of Newton’s laws but not for any relativistic reason. We seem
to have run into a problem in our articulation of certain phenomena while in the process of
building up the macroworld from the microworld.
There is, in fact, a deeper problem here that is better elucidated by looking at another
seemingly strange phenomenon: entanglement. Whether entanglement is truly a non-local
effect or can be causally explained is a hotly debated topic [22]. Most ‘interpretations’ of
quantum mechanics make some attempt at a palatable explanation of this phenomenon,
i.e. not many people simply throw up their hands and accept the non-locality of quantum
mechanics without question. We know there is a deep link between the notion of causality
(and thus locality) and reversibility, yet we also know that on the microscopic level there
are processes that are fully reversible. Nonetheless, the latter we tend to explain away by
assuming that, as we scale up, processes become irreversible as the multiplicity increases
[5, 6]. In other words, we might comfortably assume that these problems of locality and
reversibility are confined to the microscopic realm. As M. Hossein Partovi points out,
The status of the second law of thermodynamics and the emergence of macro-
scopic irreversibility from time-symmetric dynamics laws have been widely de-
bated since Boltzmann’s ground breaking work relating thermodynamic behavior
to microscopic dynamics late in the nineteenth century. Indeed, rarely have so
many distinguished physicists written as extensively on a subject while achieving
so little consensus . . . There is nevertheless a slowly growing consensus that the
asymmetry observed in macroscopic phenomena originates in the “initial con-
ditions” of our cosmic neighborhood, and ultimately that of the whole universe
[7].
Indeed, the quantum realm is usually considered to be equivalent to the microscopic realm,
though macroscopic quantum phenomena do exist, e.g. flux quantization and the Josephson
effect [8] (one could argue these are merely macro-manifestations of microscopic phenomena).
In any case, they tie the issue of the emergence of the macroworld from the microworld to the
quantum-classical trasition. Aside from the usual questions of where exactly the quantum-
classical transition occurs when scaling up (or down), Partovi himself has introduced a
twist to this that raises new questions. Using models of dilute gases, he constructed a
class of macroscopically entangled systems in which heat can flow from the colder to the
hotter system. His results actually bolster Boltzmann’s argument that the second law is an
‘emergent phenomenon that requires a low-entropy cosmological environment, one that can
effectively function as an ideal information sink’ [7].
What makes Partovi’s result so interesting is that it provides additional evidence of macro-
scopic entanglement while simultaneously suggesting a link between entanglement and the
5second law of thermodynamics. Macroscopic entanglement has already been demonstrated
in the bulk properties of magnetic materials [9] while a link between entanglement and
the second law has been suggested [10, 11], but Partovi has managed to unite all of these
concepts under a single umbrella.
All of these results call into question the very meaning of the word ‘quantum.’ If we hold
that ‘quantum’ is synonymous with ‘microscopic’ then entanglement is not a purely quantum
phenomenon (and we note that there is a clear difference here between entanglement and
mere correlation, where the latter can occur in classical systems). If we insist that only
quantum systems may be entangled, then we’re stuck with the realization that ‘quantum’ is
not synonymous with ‘microscopic.’ Either way, we once again are stuck with a macroscopic
phenomenon that can’t be explained with our neat and tidy interaction picture. We have
also run into another vaguely unsettling discord in our language of description.
IV. SOME PERSPECTIVE
One of the problems here is that, for perhaps bio-psychological reasons, we seem as
human beings to prefer axiomatized descriptions of things. We like rules. Unfortunately
this bumps up against reality in the form of incompleteness: fully axiomatized systems are
logically impossible [12]. Nevertheless, we need axioms and rules, for without them science
becomes pointless and so we do our best with what we have.
Classically, there are two types of such rules in non-relativistic physical theories: laws of
coexistence and laws of succession. The former are laws such as the ideal gas law while
the latter include the classical laws of motion. In quantum mechanics these restrictions take
the form of selection and superselection rules [13].
Symmetries of the model - of which Galileo’s relativity is the classical example
par excellence - are ‘deeper’ because they tell us something beforehand about
what the laws of coexistence and succession can look like. It is in the twentieth
century’s quantum theory that symmetry, coexistence, and succession became
most elegantly joined and most intricately connected. ([13], p.29)
The commutators and anti-commutators we discussed above generally serve as selection
rules. If a given operator commutes with all observables it is a superselection operator and
we have a superselection rule. Regarding quantum mechanics,
. . . there is a conviction that [it] as originally formulated cannot apply universally.
Two ways to say that in contemporary terminology are (a) that the principle
of superposition (i.e., for any two pure states x and y, there is a pure state
ax + by) does not have universal validity, or (b) that quantum mechanics must
be amended by allowing for superselection rules. ([13], p.261)
This leads back to the question of the synonymity of ‘quantum’ and ‘micro.’ The dividing line
between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ is rather vaguely defined in terms of our human reference frame
but humans ‘have no privileged status in fundamental physics’ ([13], p. 264). Nonetheless,
macroscopic objects are quite clearly more physically complex than microscopic ones. Van
Fraassen’s suggestion for dealing with this problem is to wonder whether observables that
may be distinguished (and this is an important qualifier) at the level of human observation
are subject to restrictions that don’t normally hold for all observables. He provides an ex-
ample by way of the measurement problem. The important point here is that superselection
6rules, as we noted above, are quantum analogues of classical laws of succession. Thus, if we
hold that ‘quantum’ is synonymous with ‘microscopic’ they ought not apply to macroscopic
phenomena.
This relation between superselection rules and macroscopic phenomena is actually
testable via the Leggett-Garg inequality [8, 14]. In quantum mechanics this inequality
is violated and means that the time evolution of quantum systems cannot be understood
classically. This muddles the applicability of superselection rules a bit since obeyance of this
inequality by macrostates indicates their eigenspaces are, indeed, separated by superselection
rules which are normally associated with quantum systems.
But all is not lost. Recently there has been a movement to understand the quantum-
classical transition via coarse-graining. Kofler and Brukner have proposed such a scheme
that does not involve violations of the Leggett-Garg inequality [15]. Nonetheless, that still
leaves open the question of the synonymity of ‘quantum’ and ‘micro’ (and of ‘classical’ and
‘macro’). Thus it is not entirely clear whether we are dealing with two problems or just
one. We may have to acknowledge that ‘macro’ emerging from ‘micro’ may not be the same
thing as ‘classical’ emerging from ‘quantum.’ As such, attempts at any sort of unification
of ideas in physics must deal with these problems of emergent phenomena.
V. IS MATHEMATICS A LANGUAGE OF DESCRIPTION?
Van Fraassen’s point on terminology - language - reminds us of the deep connection to
mathematics that all physical theories have. As we saw in our discussion of PEP, we can
have a concise mathematical description of an observable phenomenon with only a vaguely
satisfying conceptual description to accompany it. In fact, Moore describes all of quantum
mechanics as being similarly unsettling: the infinite ‘reality’ within which we exist is per-
ceived by us through a finite lens of experimental results and observations. These are usually
given a conceptual description that is then, in classical physics, translated into mathemat-
ical symbols. In other words, the mathematics is merely a shorthand for some conceptual
description (think Newton’s laws, for instance). Moore claims it is the conceptual layer that
is missing in quantum physics - we have mathematics that match experimental results but
no consistent way to conceptually explain the phenomena [16]. In paraphrasing Moore, I
added the word ‘consistent’ since we clearly do have plenty of conceptual descriptions that
we call ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics. Despite one or two of these interpretations
dominating the rhetoric at various periods in the past eight decades (e.g. the Copenhagen
interpretation - or non-interpretation; see [17]), there is enough disagreement that new in-
terpretations pop up regularly. No other area of physics, with the possible exception of the
second law of thermodynamics, elicits as much speculation. One of the most popular of
these ‘interpretations’ (if one can call it that) that includes many an experimentalist among
its proponents is the almost-serious ‘shut-up-and-calculate’ method (I hesitate to call it an
‘interpretation’ per say - rather it is an anti-interpretation or ‘method’). In a sense, this
method assumes that the mathematics do a sufficient job of ‘interpreting’ our experimental
results. But do they?
There are actually two questions that should be asked here. The first is whether mathe-
matics may serve in an interpretive role, i.e. do we really need a conceptual description? The
second is whether our conceptual descriptions are really just disguised mathematics to begin
with. To some extent this gets at the heart of the nature of mathematics. Is mathematics
discovered or constructed? Answering this question - if that is even possible - would assist
7in answering whether or not mathematics may serve in an interpretive role. If mathematics
is ‘discovered’ then perhaps it is sufficient as an interpretive device. But if it is constructed,
then it may simply represent the projection of our perceptions on the physical world. As
Baker puts it,
There is a well-known, ongoing debate concerning the proper ontology for math-
ematics, between the platonists on one side and nominalists on the other, that
arises from the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. In its basic form, this
argument proceeds from the claim that mathematical objects play an indispen-
sible role in our best scientific theories to the conclusion that we therefore ought
to rationally believe in the existence of these mathematical objects. In other
words, scientific realists ought to also be mathematical platonists. ([18], p. 612)
Moore is seemingly a mathematical platonist as, perhaps, are advocates of ‘shut-up-and-
calculate.’
Related to this is the question of whether or not our cherished conceptual notions are
really conceptual at all. We are in the habit of not questioning the conceptual aspects of
classical, Newtonian physics. But, for example, can we really conceptually describe energy?
What is energy anyway? As Feynman says about its conservation,
That is a most abstract idea, because it is a mathematical principle; it says that
there is a numerical quantity which does not change when something happens.
It is not a description of a mechanism, or anything concrete; it is just a strange
fact that we can calculate some number and when we finish watching nature go
through her tricks and calculate the number again, it is the same. ([19], p. 4-1)
Recall the admonishment of Fortun and Bernstein: ‘. . . every pure numerical value will have
to find its way into words’ ([1], p. 43). We call this particular numerical value ‘energy.’ But
where does that get us? As physicists, should we really be concerned with the philosophical
questions surrounding the nature of mathematics and reality? I answer an emphatic ‘yes’ to
that question. In attempting to develop a unified description - mathematical, conceptual,
or both - of the physical world that satisfactorily explains emergent phenomena, we will
inevitably have to confront some of these paradoxical problems. It is thus imperative that
we tackle these issues of articulation head on and, in the process, realize that what is
ultimately possible in physics may depend on what is ultimately possible in mathematics.
On a practical level we may need to ask ourselves if mathematics is a sufficient language of
description.
VI. MICHELSON’S LEGACY
What I have presented here might simultaneously give us brain cramps and a sigh of
relief. The latter is because we can be assured that our jobs as physicists are safe: there
are still plenty of problems left to solve. Recall Albert Michelson’s famous proclamation in
1894 at the opening of the Ryerson Laboratory at the University of Chicago:
The more important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been
discovered, and these are now so firmly established that the possibility of their
ever being supplanted in consequence of new discoveries is exceedingly remote
. . . Our future discoveries must be looked for in the sixth place of decimals.
8Luckily (for theorists anyway) we are no closer to this dire prediction than we were in 1894.
A true ‘theory of everything’ is not likely in the near future and any claimant to that dubious
title would need to address the aforementioned problems that serve as the potential source
of our brain cramps.
Nevertheless, unification is a laudable goal. If understood in its more general sense - as
our desire to find broader explanations to ‘unite more phenomena under fewer umbrellas’
- then any unifying theory must address the issue of how the macroscopic world in which
our sensory perceptions reside emerges from the microscopic world. In order to do that,
a unified theory would need to tackle the thorny issues I have raised here. It would need
to incorporate a consistent description of forces and force-like behavior. It would need to
address the question of what it means for something to be called ‘quantum’ and whether or
not that is synonymous with ‘microscopic.’ It would need to better articulate the wholeness
of physics. Whether any of this is possible is an open question. But keeping these ideas
in mind while pursuing unifying themes within physics is imperative, particularly if we
want physics to possess as logical and consistent a framework as possible, but also from the
standpoint of how we communicate (articulate) with each other as well as with the general
public. As Fortun and Bernstein said, ‘language matters.’
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